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Fall 2018
Hoffer, Peter Charles. Uncivil Warriors: The Lawyers’ Civil War. Oxford
University Press, $27.95 ISBN 9780190851767
Peter Hoffer, Distinguished Research Professor at the University of Georgia and author
of many books on American legal history, has now brought his expertise to the sectional crisis.
Uncivil Warriors argues that lawyers exercised an important influence on policy-making during
the Civil War. This may seem axiomatic, but the book, particularly in its focus on the role of
lawyers in political and military positions in the Union, attempts to show two things. First, the
conflict remained, as Hoffer puts it on page 119, a “civil Civil War,” meaning that the war’s
prosecution reflected a search for conduct according to various laws of war, rather than
devolving into “extremes of brutality,” as he writes on page 3, which have characterized more
modern civil wars. Second, the war’s political outcome in the constitutional end of slavery was
possible, again, because of lawyers’ prominent role in formulation of early Reconstruction policy
in 1865.
Introduced by a prologue emphasizing how the 1858 debates between Abraham Lincoln
and Stephen Douglas were a nationally publicized contest between two lawyers, the book’s
chapters are organized around several topics of the Civil War’s development in which lawyerpoliticians played a prominent role. These were arguments over the legality of secession; the
impact of lawyers on the respective presidential cabinets; the Lincoln administration’s
suspension of civilian law and prosecution of southern sympathizers John Merryman, Clement
Vallandingham, and Lambdin Milligan under military rule; the status of the Union blockade and
treatment of ships and cargo seized as blockade runners; Francis Lieber’s promulgation of
General Order 100, a code for the conduct of Union army forces during the war, known as the
Lieber Code; the legal basis for the Emancipation Proclamation and Proclamation of Amnesty
and Reconstruction; and the rationale and impact of the Thirteenth Amendment. An Epilogue
discusses how postwar conditions and changes, including new civil rights laws, the increased
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jurisdictions of federal courts, and the Constitution’s Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments, affected lawyers’ work, North and South.
Generally, Hoffer’s conclusions about the Lincoln administration’s observance of the rule
of law, if not faithfulness to the old Constitution, accords with previous studies by Mark Neely
(Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (1991)), and Daniel Farber (Lincoln’s
Constitution (2004)), although Farber concluded that Lincoln’s unilateral transfer of funds from
the U.S. Treasury to private banks to procure military supplies early in the war was likely
unconstitutional.
Hoffer goes beyond these other studies to explore the writings of several Confederate
lawyer-politicians. Not surprisingly, he concludes that generally these individuals’ views of law,
illustrated by Confederate Vice President Alexander Stephens’s Constitutional View of the Late
War between the States (1870), were far more static than their northern counterparts’.
Hoffer argues that the number and quality of lawyers in Lincoln’s administration were
superior to those in Confederate President Jefferson Davis’s, and that this disparity played a role
in shaping the war, including in its outcome of a Union victory. Besides Lincoln himself,
William Seward, Salmon Chase, Edward Bates, Gideon Welles, and Montgomery Blair were all
lawyers. Simon Cameron was a businessman, not a lawyer; his resignation as Secretary of War
on charges of disorganization and corruption, and replacement by Edwin Stanton, a lawyer,
bolsters Hoffer’s case. In Davis’s government, there were lawyers Judah Benjamin, Robert
Toombs, Alexander Stephens, Robert M. T. Hunter, John Breckinridge, and Christopher
Memminger. But for Hoffer, the fact that Davis, though a former U.S. senator and secretary of
war, was not a lawyer, contributed to his failure to organize his cabinet and to motivate southern
state governors effectively to achieve the Confederacy’s independence. Lincoln, for example,
was trained to listen to dissents from his opinion before reaching decisions; Davis’s closemindedness was notorious.
Hoffer also cites Davis’s lack of legal training to explain his violation of accepted laws of
war on at least two occasions concerning the Union military’s enlistment of African Americans even if Davis did not accept the Lieber Code, Swiss jurist Emmer de Vattel’s widely known
Laws of Nations (1758) was taught at West Point, the Confederate president’s alma mater. The
first was Davis’s proclamation that Union General Benjamin Butler was a “common enemy of
mankind,” punishable by death, for treating slaves as war contraband. The second was his
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proclamation that captured African American soldiers and their white officers were not prisoners
of war, but were to be prosecuted in accordance with the southern states’ antebellum laws against
encouraging or participating in slave insurrections.
Concerning the impact of lawyers’ presence in positions of wartime leadership, Hoffer
notes the decision of prominent southern lawyers Thomas and Howell Cobb and Laurence Keitt
to join the Confederate military, rather than serve in the Confederate executive branch. In what
he calls on page 68 a “highly speculative hypothesis,” Hoffer suggests that these individuals’
choice reflected the influence of a southern code of honor, piqued by northerners’ criticisms of
slavery, which “could only be defended on the field of battle.” In other words, southern honor
may have robbed the Confederate government of, as Hoffer puts it on the same page, “good
lawyering,” which could have made it far more efficient. This is an interesting counterfactual
idea, though it implies that the South had manpower equivalent to the North’s, or at least
adequate to allow lawyer-politicians in the region to make the same choices about how to serve
their government that Lincoln’s men did.
Given the book’s focus on northern lawyers’ contributions to using the opportunity of the
war to reshape the relationship of the federal government and the states, a reader may wish that
Hoffer had extended this intriguing but compact study at least through the immediate postwar
period, to explore the contributions of lawyer-politicians to the emergence of new civil rights
law. It was Ohio Congressman and attorney John Bingham, the “[James] Madison of the first
section of the Fourteenth Amendment,” in the words of Justice Hugo Black in 1947, and other
Radical Republicans who, as Gregory Downs showed in his After Appomattox: Military
Occupation and the Ends of War (2015), developed the argument for military occupation of the
South continuing after 1865, and who institutionalized the Civil War’s legal revolution.
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